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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BUYING IN: RESIDENCE AND CITIZENSHIP BY INVESTMENT

ALLISON CHRISTIANS*
INTRODUCTION
Italy recently announced a new immigration program that invites certain
high net worth individuals to make Italy their country of residence, enticing them
with the right to pay a “substitute tax” of €100,000 per year on their foreign
income and gains. 1 For those already residing in Italy, the highest marginal tax
rate on income is 43%, with additional regional and municipal rates bringing the
rate closer to 50%; capital gains are subject to a reduced rate (about half the
regular rate). 2 Assuming eligible immigrants have significant foreign income
and gains that would otherwise face the highest marginal rates of tax, the new
program’s outcome would seem to ensure that prior residents face a significantly
higher overall tax bracket than their new neighbours (unless of course, such
individuals use other mechanisms and programs, whether in Italy or elsewhere,
to also reduce their own tax rates).
Why would Italy design a tax scheme that appears to privilege certain
immigrants over its other taxpayers in this manner? In reporting on the program
for Forbes, journalist David Schrieberg stated that “[s]ome observers speculate
that the new tax regime is aimed particularly at super-rich individuals

* H. Heward Stikeman Chair in the Law of Taxation, McGill University Faculty of Law. This
research was assisted by a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of
Canada. Thanks for helpful comments on an early draft are due to Montano Cabezas, David
Lesperance, Henry Ordower, Peter Szigeti, and the participants of the Sanford E. Sarasohn
Conference on Critical Issues in Comparative and International Taxation II: Taxation and
Migration, Saint Louis University, 31 March 2017; as well as to Jake Heyka and Stephen Albers
for excellent research assistance.
1. Invest in Italy: Tax Regime for New Residents, AGENZIA DELLE ENTRATE, http://www1.a
genziaentrate.gov.it/english/invest_italy/new_residents_regime.htm [https://perma.cc/3NBX-BC
VX]. To qualify, residents must have “been non-tax resident in Italy for at least 9 years out of the
10 years preceding their transfer to Italy,” and successful applicants may extend the regime to their
family members at €25,000 per year per family member. Id.
2. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, 2016-17 WORLDWIDE TAX AND IMMIGRATION GUIDE 679,
681–82 (Ronald Anes ed., 2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Worldwide_Per
sonal_Tax_and_Immigration_Guide_2016-17/$FILE/Worldwide%20Personal%20Tax%20and%
20Immigration%20Guide%202016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5BH-F26M] (showing that capital
gains transactions involving a non-qualified percentage of a company’s shares are taxed at a rate
of 26%).
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considering a Brexit-induced change of residence.” 3 Schrieberg further
acknowledged that Italy is not innovative in this respect: “Various countries
including Portugal, Malta, Cyprus and Ireland have been chasing high net worth
individuals with various incentives.” 4 In fact, much of the world is engaged in
an intense competition to make wealthy individuals their own tax residents,
luring them away from rival countries. 5
International law and political theory scholars have long wrestled with the
normative implications of commodifying citizenship and access to immigration
with pay-to-play visa programs, but the analysis does not typically consider the
role the tax system plays or could play in valuing these schemes, nor how such
schemes might impact the tax regime in terms of gross revenue or distributional
effect. 6 Yet governments increasingly appear to view their tax systems as a
means of potentially increasing the value of residence and citizenship in their
countries. The decision to define nationality to fulfill strategic aims may be
viewed as consistent with the principle in international law that states are free to
define their nationality as they see fit, and that other states should recognize
these determinations unless they conflict with other international legal
principles. 7
Given the cost involved in forfeiting revenue from those arguably most able
to pay, whether the programs actually produce the predicted outcomes, is one
3. David Schrieberg, Italy Joins the European Race to Attract Wealthy Foreigners, FORBES
(Mar. 9, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidschrieberg1/2017/03/09/italy-joinsthe-european-race-to-attract-wealthy-foreigners/#61a8614361e4 [https://perma.cc/PS8L-HJ4B].
4. Id.
5. See DAVID LEY, MILLIONAIRE MIGRANTS: TRANS-PACIFIC LIFE LINES 9 (2010) (“Some
30 nations around the world have business immigration programmes, intending to entice footloose
entrepreneurs and investors to re-locate their transformative energies to a new national project of
economic development,” and that for prospective migrants, “[t]he carrot inducing their migration
is the promise of citizenship and the enhanced quality of life of advanced societies, assets that may
well be inaccessible for these migrants through other immigration entry classes.” (citations
omitted)).
6. See generally RAINER BAUBÖCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1994); CITIZENSHIP, DIVERSITY & PLURALISM:
CANADIAN AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Alan C. Cairns et al. eds., 1999); Owen Parker,
Commercializing Citizenship in Crisis EU: The Case of Immigrant Investor Programmes, 55 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 332 (2017).
7. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art.
1, Apr. 12, 1930, League of Nations Doc. C.224.M.III.1930.V (1930) (“It is for each State to
determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other States in
so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of
law generally recognised with regard to nationality.”). States might respond to strategically driven
nationality programs by declining entry to persons holding passports or visas from countries
suspected of selling passports without adequate background checks. See, e.g., Anthony Van Fossen,
Citizenship for Sale: Passports of Convenience from Pacific Island Tax Havens, 45
COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 138, 140 (2007) (discussing opposition to certain passports
following the U.S. terrorist attacks on Sept 11, 2001).
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obvious question to be asked. 8 Even if the programs, in fact, achieve their goals,
questions surely arise regarding the normative justification for using the tax
system to lure the wealthy away from other countries in this manner. Does the
normative case differ when applied to humans as opposed to companies, which
are routinely lured by many countries with various kinds of tax incentives? Does
it differ when the luring state is richer or poorer relative to the countries of origin
of prospective immigrants? Sketching out a framework for analyzing these
questions from a normative perspective requires a sense of the various
competing programs on offer. This Essay takes a first step by comparing national
programs that use their taxing power in some manner to attract immigration. The
aim is to highlight some of the factors that raise normative questions about the
appropriate design and uses of a tax system. The Essay concludes that these
questions are worthy of further study as increased competition to attract the
wealthy is likely to continue going forward.
I. WHERE TO PARK FOR TAX PURPOSES
Much of the popular narrative surrounding international tax planning
focuses on where multinational companies “park” their foreign earnings for tax
purposes. 9 Indeed, a steady stream of sensational news stories about the growing

8. See, e.g., Jelena Dzanic, The Pros and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship in
Comparative Perspective 2 (Eur. Univ. Inst., RSCAS Working Paper No. 14, 2012) (“Given the
degree of discretion that governments have in deciding upon naturalisation on these grounds,
citizenship by investment programs have raised numerous contentious questions, including those
related to tax evasion, extradition, and corruption.”). Some countries have examined their programs
and concluded that there is insufficient evidence of the promised benefits. See, e.g., DEP’T OF FIN.,
GOV’T OF CAN., THE ROAD TO BALANCE: CREATING JOBS AND OPPORTUNITIES 81 (2014),
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2014/docs/plan/pdf/budget2014-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/27M4-39CV].
Canada eliminated its federal immigrant investor program after concluding that there was “little
evidence that immigrant investors as a class are maintaining ties to Canada or making a positive
economic contribution to the country.” Id.; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., OIG-14-19, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES’
EMPLOYMENT-BASED FIFTH PREFERENCE (EB-5) REGIONAL CENTER PROGRAM 1 (2013),
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo49978/OIG_14-19_Dec13.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH9P-63
WZ]. The Department of Homeland Security was unable to “demonstrate that the program is
improving the U.S. economy and creating jobs for U.S. citizens as intended by Congress.” Id.
9. Connie Guglielmo, Apple, Google Among Top U.S. Companies Parking Cash Offshore to
Reduce Taxes, Study Says, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2013, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/con
nieguglielmo/2013/08/01/apple-google-among-top-u-s-companies-parking-cash-offshore-to-re
duce-taxes-study-says/#443d6ba41bba [https://perma.cc/SER2-XSCA] (citing U.S. PUB.
INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., OFFSHORE SHELL GAMES (2013)); see also Tim Dickinson, The
Biggest Tax Scam Ever, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/
news/the-biggest-tax-scam-ever-20140827 [https://perma.cc/PTC9-ZUZ2] (“Some of America’s
top corporations are parking profits overseas and ducking hundreds of billions in taxes. And how’s
Congress responding? It’s rewarding them for ripping us off.”); David Meyer, Here’s What You
Need to Know About Apple’s $14.5 Billion EU Tax Bill, FORTUNE (Aug. 30, 2016, 6:07 AM),
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stash of “offshore cash” held by some of the world’s largest, most visible, and,
presumably, most profitable companies was the catalyst for the ongoing
multilateral initiative to curb tax competition, known by its now-famous
acronym of BEPS, for “base erosion and profit shifting.” 10 With all eyes focused
on the kinds of tax rules that allow companies to shift their profits for tax
purposes, often without changing much or anything by way of “real” business
locations or operations, the program to counter BEPS, if successful, will shift
countries away from tax incentives that reward paper profit shifting in favour of
tax incentives that will reward shifting of other activities and operations.11
Shifting activities and operations will mean shifting people as well,
including entrepreneurs, managers, highly skilled workers, and other key
personnel. Tax incentives for favoured immigrants are but one aspect of this
brave new world of tax competition. Yet these incentives, and the implications
for countries that do not have the means to compete effectively or protect
themselves against such competition, appear to be completely off the agenda for
the countries currently focused on BEPS. 12
As Italy’s new program implies, nations stand to gain from luring the
wealthy in hopes that their fortunes will follow. Ultimately, the rich migrant
population might be expected to become part of the tax base when the incentive
expires, generating spillover effects in the meantime. 13 In a world of increasing
http://fortune.com/2016/08/30/apple-tax-ireland-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/U22D-VUBL] (“Apple
has certainly claimed that it parks so much money offshore because of the U.S. tax code.”); Scott
Thurm & Kate Linebaugh, More U.S. Profits Parked Abroad, Saving on Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
10, 2013, 8:15 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873240348045783481314326
34740.html [https://perma.cc/MM5J-U9Y3]; Press Release, Opening Statement by John McCain
on Apple Inc.’s Offshore Tax Avoidance (May 21, 2013), https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/press-releases?ID=C7781CE2-0700-D17F-6F9F-6BFF724BCAD2 [https://perma.cc/M
9XR-HPZG] (Sen. John McCain stated: “Today, Apple has over $100 billion, more than two-thirds
of its total profits, stashed away in an offshore account. That’s over $100 billion that are not
currently subject to U.S. corporate income taxes . . . .”).
10. For a discussion, see Allison Christians, BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016
BYU L. REV. 1603, 1604–05 (2017).
11. See, e,g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 95, 97 (2014); Christians,
supra note 10, at 1631.
12. The use of tax incentives to lure prospective migrants, and the effect of such incentive
programs on other countries, is nowhere discussed in the fifteen action items identified and
negotiated at the OECD as part of the BEPS project. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.
[OECD], OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: 2015 FINAL REPORTS,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-reports-2015-executive-summa
ries.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FZY-9H5K].
13. See LEY, supra note 5, at 9 (“[From the state’s perspective,] the business immigrant as
homoeconomicus is a trophy acquisition in a neo-liberal policy regime, top prize in the skilled
immigrant stakes. Not merely self-supporting, the business immigrant has both the skill and the
wealth to add value, to create jobs for others, and provide tax revenues for the state.” (citations
omitted)). This view is echoed in government materials promoting their investor visa programs.
See, e.g., Dep’t of Immigration & Border Prot., What Is the Significant Investor Visa and Premium
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wealth inequality and a limited number of eligible elites to target for
immigration, it is a buyer’s market for the geographically mobile consumer of
fiscally convenient tax residency. 14 As a result, whether the wealthy will park
themselves in Italy as opposed to another jurisdiction depends on a calculation
of multiple personal and social factors, but also a calculation of the costs and
benefits of competing residence programs that offer tax incentives to
immigrants.
In thinking about the consequences for the tax system of immigrant investor
programs and vice versa, a distinction must be made between types of
immigration programs, since not all offer tax reductions relative to existing
residents. 15 Indeed, the distinctions between programs that do and do not offer
tax reductions are stark reminders that the relative value of jurisdictional ties to
prospective immigrants are driven in large part by pre-existing wealth and
associated disparities among nations. Here, as in other forms of tax competition,
smaller and poorer jurisdictions appear to be at a distinct disadvantage to their
G7 and OECD counterparts, which do not need to sacrifice the integrity of their
tax systems to attract prospective immigrants. 16 As Table 1 below demonstrates,
Investor Visa?, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, http://www.border.gov.au/Lega/Lega/Form/Immi-FAQs/
what-is-the-significant-investor-visa [https://perma.cc/KZ2C-N5L9] (“The purpose of the visa is
to provide a boost to the Australian economy and to compete effectively for high net worth
individuals seeking investment migration.”).
14. See, e.g., KATHRIN BRANDMEIR ET AL., ALLIANZ GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 2015, at 45
(Heike Bahr et al. eds., 2015) (Ger.), https://www.allianz.com/v_1444215837000/media/econom
ic_research/publications/specials/en/AGWR2015_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV46-Q96F]. The
United States is the world’s wealthiest country but also the most unequal among 55 countries
studied. Also, “[t]here are now fewer people of ‘high wealth’ than there were at the start of the
millennium [and] . . . the distribution of wealth within the countries . . . has also become
significantly ‘less equal,’ with assets concentrated in the hands of ever fewer people.” Id.; see also
Adam Withnall, All the World’s Most Unequal Countries Revealed in One Chart, INDEPENDENT
(Nov. 23, 2016, 3:12 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/credit-suisse-globalwealth-world-most-unequal-countries-revealed-a7434431.html [https://perma.cc/KV5Z-X7ZY]
(“Credit Suisse said the world had been growing more equal from the start of the century until 2008.
‘The trend reversed after the financial crisis,’ its report notes however, and while the most recent
data is only provisional it looks set to continue to get more unequal.”).
15. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
16. Among the G7 countries, four (Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) offer immigration by investment programs, all of which involve significant investment
amounts and none of which include a tax benefit that is not also available to domestic residents.
For example, the U.S. Employment-Based Fifth Preference (EB-5) Program does not offer tax
incentives to new immigrants, but is merely a path to permanent residency for those willing to
invest a given amount of capital in the United States. For a description of the EB-5 program, see
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN, supra note 8, at 2. The same is true for the program offered by France.
For a description of the French program, see Emmanuel Ruchat, The French Residence Card for
an Exceptional Economic Contribution, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=32401
[https://perma.cc/8822-FFN5?type=image]. The same was true for the Canadian federal program,
but that program was abolished in 2014. See DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 8 (explaining abandonment
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smaller and poorer countries tend to command a much lower price for their
immigration programs. 17 Countries that appear to give up more by way of fiscal
incentives also tend to have less flexibility to make up for lost revenues by
shifting tax burdens to other sectors. 18 Piling on to this built-in disadvantage,
these countries face significant challenges in keeping their own highly skilled
and high net worth populations from migrating to other countries, which also
negatively impacts them socially, politically, and economically. 19
TABLE 1: HOW MUCH TO LURE RICH RESIDENTS? SELECTED OBSERVATIONS 20
Jurisdiction

Type of Program

Cost in
USD

Panama

Friendly Nation Visa

$5,000

Paraguay

Residence by Investment

$5,200

Thailand

Elite Easy Access

$15,000

Lithuania

Entrepreneur

$16,400

of program in Government’s 2014 Budget bill). A provincial version of the same program in
Quebec remains. See Investor Program, GOV’T QUE., http://www.immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/
en/immigrate-settle/businesspeople/applying-business-immigrant/three-programs/investors/in
dex.html [https://perma.cc/6TV5-TZD2]. While the United Kingdom has long excluded foreign
income from taxation when earned by “non-domiciled residents,” this benefit is not limited to
immigrants and the country’s investor visa program is not explicitly tied to residence status or other
tax benefits. See Tax on Foreign Income, GOV’T U.K., https://www.gov.uk/tax-foreign-income/
non-domiciled-residents [https://perma.cc/ZF4W-AJ2M] (explaining the taxation of nondomiciled residents); United Kingdom Tier 1 (Investor) Visa, GOV’T U.K., https://www.gov.uk/tier
-1-investor/overview [https://perma.cc/893E-ZCF5].
17. See infra Table 1. Data compiled by the author, available upon request.
18. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least
Developed Countries, 42 U. B.C. L. REV. 239, 250, 253, 256 (2010) (suggesting that this practice
has “created major constraints for tax policy design in the least developed countries”).
19. See, e.g., Devesh Kapur, Addressing the Brain Drain: A Partial Cosmopolitanism
Approach, 36 S. AF. J. PHIL. 45, 49–50 (2017) (“[There are multiple uncertainties regarding the
economic and social impact of migration from global south to global north countries, but it is a]
basic reality that all countries want immigrants with high levels of human capital for a reason. They
are the future innovators, entrepreneurs, institution builders and tax payers. Conversely, their loss
can harm domestic knowledge access, have adverse fiscal consequences for source countries, and
weaken institutions.” (citations omitted)); Seán M. Muller, The Economics and Philosophy of the
Brain Drain: A Critical Perspective from the Periphery, 36 S. AF. J. PHIL. 115, 116, 118–20 (2017)
(critiquing economic theory that suggests source countries benefit from migration of highly skilled
labour to richer countries).
20. The table shows a selection of residence by investment programs for comparison purposes,
and is not a comprehensive listing of all residence by investment programs currently available.
USD dollar amounts were calculated by reference to currency exchange available as of April 2017.
Each program features important distinctions among residence requirements, terms, additional fees,
and other requirements. Data compiled by the author, available upon request.
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Latvia

Investor - Equity Capital Investment

$40,288

Macedonia

Residence

$43,460

Costa Rica

Investor Visa

$60,000

United Kingdom

Tier 1 Entrepreneur

$62,525

Ukraine

Investor Visa

$108,650

Colombia

Colombia Investor Visa

$134,444

Jersey

High Value Residency

$135,813

Canada (Quebec)

Entrepreneur Program

$147,580

Cayman Islands

Residency for persons of independent
means (Cayman Brac or Little Cayman)

$152,439

Brazil

Permanent Investor Visa

$159,850

Andorra

Residence by Investment

$250,000

Greece

Residency - Real-Estate Purchase

$271,625

Portugal

Art, Culture, and Public Interest
Investment

$271,625

United Arab Emirates

Real estate investor visa

$272,200

Turks & Caicos

Villas program

$300,000

France

“Talent” program (providing 3-yr
residence)

$325,950

Cyprus

Residence by Investment

$358,545

South Korea

Immigrant Investor Scheme for Real
Estate (F-2/ F-5)

$450,000

China

Investor Visa

$500,000

Mauritius

Naturalization for Investors (IRS
(Integrated Resort Scheme) and RES
(Real Estate Scheme))

$500,000

United States

Investor Visa (2) - EB 5

$500,000

Ireland

Investor Program - Support of charity

$543,250

Spain

Real-Estate Investment

$543,250

Australia

Business Innovation (188 provisional)

$756,100

Seychelles

Investor Type A

$1,000,000

New Zealand

Investor

$1,051,350

Netherlands
Singapore

Dutch Investor Visa for High Net Worth
Individuals
Global Investors Program - Option A
(New Business or Expanding Business)

$1,358,125
$1,794,000
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Italy’s program (and that of similar programs, such as those in the United
Kingdom and Portugal) offers a reduced tax rate on specified income relative to
non-immigrants. 21 Other programs do not offer any special tax breaks but are
simply intended to exchange the right to become a legal resident (and in some
cases a citizen) in exchange for a service fee plus a specified investment in the
country, whether in business, real property, or employment, for a specified time
period. 22 One characterization is that these programs are nothing more than a
fast lane to visa status for those who can pay the premium. However, the
immigration by investment program may be the only viable way to obtain a visa
in some circumstances. 23
A number of countries offer fast-track immigration programs, with varying
types, levels, and lengths of investment required. 24 Many seek inbound
investment in specified sectors, the most popular being real property, domestic
businesses, and start-ups. 25 Others do not specify the industry, but differential
rates for varying types of property income may be relevant to the immigrant
investor. 26
There is a fairly broad range of required investment in such programs, with
some very inexpensive, such as Dominica’s investor citizenship application,
which affords the applicant a Dominican passport, without the need to ever visit
21. For a discussion, see generally Leila Adim, Between Benefit and Abuse: Immigrant
Investor Programs, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 121 (2017).
22. This describes, inter alia, the programs in Canada and the United States. For a description
of the Canadian program, see GOV’T QUE., supra note 16. For a description of the U.S. program,
see EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.
gov/eb-5 [https://perma.cc/D8G6-R7P3].
23. See Dzanic, supra note 8, at 2, 11.
24. See, e.g., Bulgaria: Residency & Citizenship by Investment, ARTON CAP., https://www.art
oncapital.com/global-citizen-programs/bulgaria/ [https://perma.cc/BG3H-RAQB] (describing
Bulgaria’s fast-track visa program); Investor Visas: United Kingdom, LAW LIBR. CONG. (June 9,
2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/investor-visas/united-kingdom.php#_ftnref6 [https://perma.
cc/V35Z-ZEKL] (describing U.K.’s fast-track investor visa program); Recent Revisions in the
Cyprus Permanent Residency by Investment (Fast-Track) Program, C. SAAVA & ASSOCIATES LTD
(June 10, 2016), http://www.savvacyprus.com/AboutUs/PublicationsBrochures/tabid/147/ID/328/
Recent-revisions-in-the-Cyprus-Permanent-Residency-by-Investment-Fast-track-program.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6CLS-L6EH] (describing Cyprus’s fast-track investor visa program).
25. Details with respect to a selection of investor immigrant programs are on file with the
author and available upon request.
26. For example, Latvia offers four residence by investment programs that are linked to
investment in equity capital, a credit institution, real estate in the Regia area, or real estate in other
areas, respectively. See Legal Reports: Investor Visas: Latvia, LAW LIBR. CONG. (June 9, 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/investor-visas/latvia.php [https://perma.cc/9C97-Z55R]. Similarly,
Portugal’s five residence by investment programs are linked to investment in general real estate;
refurbished real estate; equity capital; art, culture and public interest; and research and technology,
respectively. See Golden Residence Permit Programme, PORTUGUESE IMMIGR. & BORDER SERV.,
http://www.sef.pt/portal/v10/en/aspx/apoiocliente/detalheApoio.aspx?fromIndex=0&id_Linha=6
269 [https://perma.cc/8EVF-63EA].
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the country, for a mere $100,000 USD. 27 Dominica’s program is a good example
of straightforward commodification of citizenship, in which the state’s goal is
clearly to raise revenue by a means other than taxation, rather than to actually
lure wealthy foreign individuals to take up residence. 28 Table 2 below provides
a snapshot of countries that offer citizenship for a set price without requiring
residence.
TABLE 2: CITIZENSHIP BY INVESTMENT WITH NO RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT 29
Jurisdiction

Program

Year Est.

Antigua &
Barbuda

National Development Fund (nonrefundable)

2013

Austria*

Extraordinary Merit

unknown

Bulgaria**

Fast Track To Citizenship
Program

2013

Empowering
Legislation
Citizenship
by
Investment
Act of 2013
Art. 10 (6) of
the Austrian
Citizenship
Act
Foreigners in
the Republic
of Bulgaria
Act

27. Vendors of legal services in connection with applying for Dominican citizenship advise
prospective applicants that:
The Caribbean citizenship program’s investment criteria were originally scheduled to
increase significantly in August 2016, with the minimum price of a Dominica passport
rising 75% to $175,000. This major cost increase has now been put on hold until 2017, so
if you are interested in becoming a Dominica citizen, we encourage you to act fast.
DOMINICA CITIZENSHIP BY INV., HTTP://WWW.DOMINICACITIZENSHIPBYINVESTMENT.COM/
[https://perma.cc/YBY3-JAJH]; see DOMINICA CONST., § 101 (authorizing the acquisition of
Dominica citizenship by a person otherwise not eligible); see also DOMINICA CITIZENSHIP ACT, §
8, § 20(1) (establishing requirements for obtaining Dominica citizenship).
28. See, e.g., Till Bruckner, Battered by Climate Change, Small Island States Turn to Selling
Passports, DOMINICA NEWS ONLINE (July 26, 2016, 9:45 AM), http://dominicanewsonline.com/
news/homepage/news/general/battered-by-climate-change-small-island-states-turn-to-sellingpassports/ [https://perma.cc/G276-BJQP] (explaining the economic rationale behind Dominica’s
citizenship by investment program and quoting Dominica’s permanent representative to the United
Nations that the program is “a major source of state revenue”).
29. Program data compiled by the author and available upon request.
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Comoros Economic Citizenship
Program

2001

Dominica

Citizenship by Investment
Program

1993

Grenada

Donation to National
Transformation Fund

2013

Malta

Individual Investor Program

2014

Saint-Kitts and
Nevis

Citizenship by Investment
Program-Sugar Industry
Diversification Foundation
Contribution

1984

Serbia

Serbian Development Fund

2016

St. Lucia

National Economic Fund

2016
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2015
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Immigration
Act (Cap 66)

* Austria’s program is conditioned on “extraordinary merit” as determined by the
government on a case-by-case basis, so mere investment is not sufficient to obtain
citizenship.
** Bulgaria requires two “statutory visits” to the country.

There are no aggregate public statistics regarding how many individuals
have applied for or received passports under these programs. 30 Based on
advertising by legal and financial services providers to assist prospective
citizenship applicants, some, such as Dominica’s economic citizenship package,
appear intended mainly to offer even modestly wealthy nonresidents a second
citizenship for convenient visa-free travel, rather than to target solely high net
worth applicants or to seek nonresidents to take up permanent residence. 31
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a second or third citizenship may be viewed
as valuable for other non-tax purposes including giving children options for
future work or study abroad. 32
However, other economic citizenship programs, such as that of Comoros,
seem to contemplate assisting high net worth individuals in achieving privacy
and “asset protection” goals. 33 No current financial and legal services advertisers

30. However, there are some reports of the success of various programs in terms of number of
passports granted or amount of revenue raised in a given year. For example, the government of
Dominica announced in 2016 that its investor citizenship program “was exceeding all expectations,
raising US$46 million during the first six months alone” and “[a]n official list of foreigners granted
citizenship during the financial year 2014-15 . . . contains 158 names, a number broadly in line with
officially reported budget revenues from the programme for that period.” Bruckner, supra note 28.
31. DOMINICA CITIZENSHIP BY INV., supra note 27 (“[T]he Commonwealth of Dominica
passport provides visa-free or visa on arrival access to more than 115 countries around the world
including the entire European Union, Switzerland, Singapore, and Hong Kong . . . [and] offers the
cheapest citizenship by investment program in the world with reputable second passports starting
at only $100,000 USD.”).
32. See, e.g., Glenda Williams, Buying Residency or a Passport with Offshore Property,
FINWEEK (May 6, 2017) (S. Afr.), http://m.fin24.com/fin24/Finweek/Featured/buying-residencyor-a-passport-with-offshore-property-20170605 [https://perma.cc/QB6M-RTR3] (“Many families
are buying into these programmes to provide their children with international opportunities and the
option to study abroad.”); Buying Foreign Citizenship, MONEYWEB (May 27, 2015, 12:33 AM)
(S. Afr.), https://www.moneyweb.co.za/investing/offshore-investing/buying-foreign-citizenship/
[https://perma.cc/BY6B-J59H] (stating that many people considering EU investor programs do so
not in order to move themselves but “mainly to give their children the opportunity to work and
study in Europe”).
33. See What You Need to Know About Comoros Citizenship by Investment, MULTITRAVEL
CONSULTANTS, INC., http://www.comoros-citizenship.com/citizenship-by-investment/ [https://per
ma.cc/DCM8-QGB4] (“[T]he Comoros citizenship program . . . provides protection for your assets
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explicitly state tax evasion as a goal, but many advertise investor residence and
citizenship programs as means to achieve legal tax avoidance via a change in tax
residence. 34 Tax planning may be accomplished with second citizenship, for
example, where one’s nationality is relevant to the assignment of tax residency
under a treaty. 35
Other programs are more explicitly designed to attract the wealthy to
become permanent residents and taxpayers. The “Dutch Investor Visa for High
Net Worth Individuals” is a good example of one such program. 36 The Dutch
Investor Visa program offers permanent residence by investment for eligible
applicants who invest €1,250,000 in one of four specified investment categories,
but appears to offer no particular tax relief once they are resident. 37 With top
individual marginal tax rates above 50% in the Netherlands, 38 this program is
not about luring immigrants with tax reductions; rather, it is solely about offering
a fast path to immigration. That appears to be the case for many investor
residency programs offered by the world’s wealthiest countries. 39

and provides a high degree of privacy. As a part of this privacy agreement, your home country will
never be notified that you have obtained a citizenship of the Comoros Islands.”).
34. See, e.g., Andrew Henderson, About Us, NOMAD CAPITALIST, http://nomadcapitalist.com/
about/ [https://perma.cc/M9KN-2UWK] (stating as among his primary goals, “[h]elping people
save $280,000 a year in taxes”); Legal Tax Avoidance, PT SHAMROCK LTD., http://ptshamrock.
com/estate.html [https://perma.cc/E7KA-3VZV].
35. Article 4 of the OECD model tax convention provides that when an individual is
considered a resident under the domestic laws of each state, residence will be assigned based on a
cascading set of tie-breaker rules, beginning with the location of the individual’s permanent home
and economic connections and, when all the other factors are non-determinative, ending with
nationality. OECD, Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital art. 4, Jan.
28, 2013, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf [https://perma.cc/R28N-S3TP]. For a
person that is a national of only one of the two party states, tax residence status thus ultimately
follows that nationality. However, the status of a dual national is ultimately determined by mutual
agreement of the two states, thus preserving the possibility that the individual may be assigned
residency in their preferred state. See id.
36. For program information, see Investing in the Netherlands, NETH. IMMIGR. &
NATURALISATION
SERV.,
https://ind.nl/en/other/Pages/Investing-in-the-Netherlands.aspx
[https://perma.cc/X76F-74SK].
37. The four areas are direct investment in an “innovative Dutch company; [a] contractual
joint venture that invests in one or more innovative companies; [a] participation fund affiliated with
the Netherlands Venture Capital Association (NVP); and [a] seed fund recognized by the Minister
of Economic Affairs.” Foreign Investors Scheme Eligibility Criteria Relaxed, FRAGOMEN, DEL
REY, BERNSEN & LOWEY, LLP (July 12, 2016), https://www.fragomen.com/knowledge-center/
immigration-alerts/foreign-investors-scheme-eligibility-criteria-relaxed [https://perma.cc/XX4MGLBH].
38. Tax Rates in the Netherlands 2017, EXPATAX, https://www.expatax.nl/tax-rates-2017
[https://perma.cc/YY24-XCNJ] (showing that the top individual marginal tax rates in Netherlands
are above 50%).
39. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 8, at 2 (showing that U.S. investor visa
program requires investment of $500,000 or $1 million USD, depending on the circumstances); see
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Immigration specialists seeking to provide legal services to potential
applicants for the Dutch program describe it as designed to attract wealthy Asian
investors in particular, but they characterized the response as “underwhelming,”
citing its high cost and restrictions. 40 However, these legal service providers
expect increased success in the program owing to the relaxation of certain
investment conditions, including, notably, the removal of a condition that the
applicant submit a report from an accountant “certifying that the investment
funds were not obtained illegally.” 41 It seems that this requirement deterred
investors because their accountants “were not willing to accept liability for
producing such a report.” 42 This exchange highlights one of the major problems
of immigration by investment programs, namely, that unless safeguards are put
in place, the risk is significant that the dishonest will find it easier than the honest
to migrate to the countries of their choice.
II. BARRIERS TO EXIT
Establishing residence in another country to avoid taxes in wealthy countries
would be attractive only if the former tax residency in such countries can be
terminated at little cost. This is not easily managed when the individual does not
actually want to sever all ties to her country of original residence, but only seeks
to generate the appearance of having transferred her residence. A foreign tax
residency program that is based on delivering a tax reduction is not effective if
the original residence country refuses to accept the putative emigrant’s claim of
having left. 43 Accordingly, the value of tax migration lies not only in the luring
jurisdiction offering an individual residency and a lowered tax burden, but also
in the jurisdiction left behind accepting the claimed termination of residence for
tax purposes. Perhaps because of this risk, many countries have residency
termination rules designed to thwart, in effect, tax residence games.
These might be referred to colloquially as “sticky” or “clinging” residency
rules. Some of these are designed simply to make sure that residents have truly
CONTACT SING., SING. ECON. DEV. BOARD, GLOBAL INVESTOR PROGRAMME 2 (May 1, 2017)
(showing that Singapore Global Investor Program requires an investment of $2.5 million USD);
Immigration N.Z., Investor Visas, N.Z. NOW, https://www.newzealandnow.govt.nz/move-to-nz/
new-zealand-visa/visas-to-invest/investor-visa [https://perma.cc/4WBV-MR64] (showing $1
million USD investment required for New Zealand Immigrant Investor Program).
40. Christine Sullivan, The Dutch Investor’s Permit: Twice as Nice, FRAGOMEN, DEL REY,
BERNSEN & LOWEY, LLP: BLOG (July 15, 2016), https://www.fragomen.com/knowledge-center/
articles/dutch-investor%E2%80%99s-permit-twice-nice [https://perma.cc/Y8C9-LKYG].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., R. v. Reeder, 1975 CarswellNat 163, para. 18 (Can. Tax Ct.) (WL) (rejecting the
taxpayer’s contention that he had severed his residence in Canada and therefore subjecting him to
full worldwide income taxation by Canada, with relief from double taxation afforded by treaty or
statute as the case may be); Bensoiuilah v. The Queen, 2009 CarswellNat 4249, para. 19 (Can. Tax
Ct.) (WL) (stating that “it is not easy to stop being a resident of Canada”).
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departed before terminating their tax status, sometimes because departure is
often akin to death for tax purposes, as assets may be deemed disposed, giving
rise to phantom income. 44 For example, Finland treats nonresident citizens as
tax residents for three years after they emigrate unless they demonstrate that they
no longer have any ties to Finland. 45 Similarly, Hungary treats nonresident
citizens as permanent tax residents of Hungary, unless they also have another
nationality or reside in a country that has a tax treaty with Hungary. 46
Other clinging residency rules are expressly designed to thwart residents
from migrating to a more tax-favourable jurisdiction. For example, until a major
tax reform in 2015, Italy treated nonresident citizens as permanent tax residents
if they move to a blacklisted tax haven unless they demonstrated lack of ties to
Italy. 47 Likewise, Spain treats nonresident citizens as tax residents for five years
following a move to a blacklisted tax haven. 48 Usually these kinds of constraints
to tax migration are unilateral, but they might also arise from bilateral
agreement: France treats nonresident citizens as permanent tax residents if they
move from France to Monaco, pursuant to a treaty between the two nations. 49

44. This is the case, for example, in Canada. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 1 § 128.1(1)
(Can.) (deeming disposition of certain types of property upon the taxpayer ceasing to be resident
of Canada; the taxpayer may in certain circumstances make an election to defer to a later date the
inclusion of taxable gain thereby produced).
45. Moving away from Finland: Finnish Citizens and the 3-Year Rule, FINNISH TAX ADMIN.
(May 10, 2017), https://www.vero.fi/en/individuals/tax-cards-and-tax-returns/moving_away_
from_finland/finnish_citizens_and_the_3year_rul/ [https://perma.cc/V4HK-TBFK] (“If you are a
citizen of Finland and you leave Finland to live in a foreign country, you will normally continue as
a Finnish tax resident during the tax year of your relocation, and for the three following tax years
(this rule is known as the three-year rule). During this period, your tax residency cannot normally
be changed to Finnish tax non-residency unless you make a specific request and can demonstrate
that during the relevant tax year you no longer have any economic and social ties that connect you
with Finland.”).
46. See, e.g., DELOITTE, TAXATION AND INVESTMENT IN HUNGARY 2015: REACH,
RELEVANCE, AND RELIABILITY 21 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global
/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-hungaryguide-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ6V-F2T7].
47. See Italy Issues Major Changes to International Tax Rules, ERNST & YOUNG (Sept. 28,
2015), http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert—italy-issues-major-changesto-international-tax-rules [https://perma.cc/D83N-7UGM].
48. See ERNST & YOUNG, SPAIN REDUCES ITS TAX HAVEN “BLACKLIST” 1 (2012),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/International_tax_alert_-_19_January_2012_-_
Spain_reduces_its_tax_haven_blacklist/$FILE/EY_tax_news_2012012408.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4APT-RQSJ].
49. Ordonnance n. 3.037 du 19/08/1963 rendant exécutoire à Monaco la Convention fiscale
signée à Paris le 18 mai 1963 [Order no. 3.037 of 08/19/1963 rendering enforceable in Monaco the
Tax Convention signed in Paris on May 18, 1963] art. 7, http://www.legimonaco.mc/305/legism
clois.nsf/db3b0488a44ebcf9c12574c7002a8e84/a7ab7aa3f21e31c3c1257c5a002f1824!OpenDocu
ment&Highlight=0,rendant,ex%C3%A9cutoire,%C3%A0,Monaco,la,Convention,fiscale,sign%C
3%A9e,%C3%A0,Paris,le,18,mai,1963 [https://perma.cc/HQM3-BRRY] (“Persons of French
nationality who transport their domicile or residence to Monaco or who can not prove that they
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Finally, both Eritrea and the United States seek to tax their respective
citizens regardless of residence, albeit with vastly different strategies and
outcomes. 50 Eritrea theoretically imposes taxation on its nonresident citizens
permanently, at a reduced flat rate of 2% of worldwide income. 51 However, it
does this to finance an ongoing war and has been denounced by the United States
and the United Nations for the practice. 52 In addition, efforts by Eritrean officials
to enforce its tax system overseas have been met by strong resistance in other
countries, including the threatened expulsion of Eritrean government officials
from their foreign consulates and posts. 53 Eritrea is perhaps not a good case
study for examining the normative bounds of the tax jurisdiction. However, the
United States, equally bold in asserting its right to tax nonresident citizens, has
no better claim.
In fact, the U.S. claim over its nonresident citizens is much more onerous
than that of Eritrea: all U.S. citizens (with an exception for Puerto Rican
residents discussed below) are taxed permanently as if they resided in the United
States. 54 Nonresident U.S. citizens, including dual citizens born abroad and of
modest means, face what is arguably the world’s most complex tax regime,
namely the international sections of the U.S. Code. This regime is rife with
have five years of habitual residence in Monaco on 13 October 1962 will be subject, in France, to
the personal income tax and the supplementary tax under the same conditions as if they had their
domicile or residence in France.”).
50. See, e.g., Cynthia Blum & Paula N. Singer, A Coherent Policy Proposal for US. ResidenceBased Taxation of Individuals, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 705, 706, 706 n.3 (2008) (describing
and distinguishing U.S. and Eritrean citizenship-based tax regimes).
51. MARTIN PLAUT, UNDERSTANDING ERITREA: INSIDE AFRICA’S MOST REPRESSIVE STATE
178 (2016).
52. S.C. Res. 2023, ¶ 10 (Dec. 5, 2011); see also Security Council, by Vote of 13 in Favour,
Adopts Resolution Reinforcing Sanctions Regime Against Eritrea ‘Calibrated’ to Halt All Activities
Destabilizing Region, UNITED NATIONS (Dec 5, 2011), http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10
471.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/PK4B-AMPZ].
53. See Meagan Fitzpatrick, Eritrean Diplomat Ordered Out of Canada After ‘Tax’ on Expats, CBC NEWS (May 29, 2013, 10:23 PM) (Can.), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/eritrean-diplo
mat-ordered-out-of-canada-after-tax-on-ex-pats-1.1309691 [https://perma.cc/89P3-2HVS]; Sam
Jones, Diaspora Tax for Eritreans Living in UK Investigated by Metropolitan Police, GUARDIAN
(June 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/09/eritrea-diasporatax-uk-investigated-metropolitan-police [https://perma.cc/48K8-WCCP] (“Metropolitan police are
examining allegation that the Eritrean embassy in London is illegally using a controversial diaspora
tax to ‘punish and control’ Eritreans living in the UK . . . .”); Martin Plaut, ‘The Long Arm of the
Eritrean Regime’ – Official Dutch Report, WORDPRESS: MARTINPLAUT BLOG (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2016/12/16/the-long-arm-of-the-eritrean-regime-official-dutch
-report/ [https://perma.cc/4FAS-E2PP] (providing English translation of report commissioned by
the Dutch government that describes the activities of the Eritrean regime inside the Netherlands);
see also PLAUT, supra note 51, at 178–79 (explaining the international response to Eritrea’s
diaspora tax).
54. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(A) (2012) (defining U.S. persons for tax purposes to include U.S.
citizens).
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attribution, look-through, and anti-abuse rules designed for the most
sophisticated taxpayers, 55 and has proven to be virtually immune to compliance
by persons of modest means living permanently in other countries. 56
Persons with U.S. citizenship are therefore significantly less able to take
advantage of foreign immigration incentive programs, owing to the unique
inclusion of all citizens as permanent tax residents of the United States
regardless of whether they have any personal or economic ties to the jurisdiction
or even speak the language. 57 However, two features of the U.S. tax system
potentially provide incentives for U.S. citizens to relocate abroad.
First, the foreign earned income exclusion might make it worthwhile for
certain moderately wealthy U.S. citizens to relocate abroad so long as they
engage in strict planning with respect to their financial investments and
generally keep most of their passive investments and any business operations
exclusively within the United States, and earning mostly or only employment
income abroad. 58 Second, relocation to Puerto Rico could be a means to lower

55. For a survey, see generally ALLISON CHRISTIANS, SAMUEL A. DONALDSON & PHILIP F.
POSTLEWAITE, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2d ed. 2011).
56. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO PAPER: SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION
EXPERIENCES ABROAD (1999) (explaining unresolved double taxation problems involving pension
funds earned abroad by nonresident U.S. citizens); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-14-99,
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RELATING TO SOCIAL SECURITY INDIVIDUAL PRIVATE ACCOUNTS (1999);
Gregory N. Filosa, International Pension Reform: Lessons for the United States, 19 TEMP. INT’L
& COMP. L.J. 133 (2005) (discussing pension reform efforts in other countries); Barbara E. Kritzer,
Individual Accounts in Other Countries, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 31 (2005) (discussing countries that
have implemented personal accounts as part of their mandatory retirement income systems). For a
discussion of the layperson’s reaction to learning about U.S. citizenship-based taxation as it applies
to dual citizens living permanently in other countries, see Allison Christians, Understanding the
Accidental American: Tina’s Story, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 833 (2015). For a more technical
explanation of the relevant provisions, see Allison Christians, Taxpayer Rights in the United States,
in DERECHO TRIBUTARIO Y DRECHOS HUMANOS [TAX LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 509 (César
Alejandro Ruiz Jiménez ed., 2016) (Spain).
57. See I.R.C. § 1(c) (2012) (imposing U.S. federal income taxation on “every individual”);
I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (defining income for tax purposes as “all income from whatever source
derived”). While this construction would purport to include the entire global population, the
Internal Revenue Code later limits the federal income taxation of noncitizens who are not residing
in the United States. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(B) (defining a “nonresident alien” as an individual
who is “neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the United States”); I.R.C. § 871
(2012) (limiting the U.S. federal income taxation of nonresident aliens to income derived from U.S.
sources). Accordingly, an individual that is a U.S. citizen, like all other residents of the United
States, is generally subject to federal income taxation on their worldwide income. As discussed
below, some exceptions apply for residents of Puerto Rico.
58. See I.R.C. § 911(a)–(b) (2012). This is because the foreign earned income exclusion
generally applies only to “earned” income, meaning mostly employment income, and because
passive and business income earned by individuals through foreign corporations and trusts are
subject to highly complex and punitive reporting and deemed income regimes. For an overview of
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one’s tax burden, since Puerto Rican residents, unlike all other U.S. citizens, are
not subject to U.S. federal income tax on their domestic income. 59 This fact
might seem to make Puerto Rico an ideal jurisdiction to offer residence by
investment particularly to U.S. citizens. However, U.S. federal taxation does
apply to the non-Puerto Rican income of Puerto Rican residents. 60 The benefits
of relocation would thus be relatively small for investors who retain significant
sources of foreign income, a likely scenario given Puerto Rico’s relatively weak
economy. 61
The Puerto Rican exception to U.S. taxation is interesting because, like the
United States, Puerto Rico’s tax residency standard is bright line and mainly
based on presence: an individual becomes a tax resident by being present for at
least 183 days during the year in Puerto Rico as determined under the substantial
presence test, by not having a tax home outside Puerto Rico during the tax year,
and by not having a closer connection to the United States or a foreign country
than to Puerto Rico. 62 Notwithstanding the Puerto Rican exception, the rule for
U.S. citizens is that establishing foreign residence has only modest impacts on
tax outcomes, as tax reductions gained through the foreign earned income
exemption are often more than reversed in terms of the increased planning
required to avoid imputed income distributions as well as onerous annual
compliance costs. 63
Countries clearly need a way to respond to the possibility that taxpayers may
use immigrant investor programs to thwart taxation by their home countries. By
extending its jurisdictional reach far past the global norm of residence, the
United States seems to have the strongest armour at present, making it a potential
these issues and how they impact nonresident U.S. persons, see Allison Christians, A Global
Perspective on Citizenship-Based Taxation, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 193 (2017).
59. I.R.C. § 933 (2012) (“The following items shall not be included in gross income and shall
be exempt from taxation under this subtitle: . . . In the case of an individual who is a bona fide
resident of Puerto Rico during the entire taxable year, income derived from sources within Puerto
Rico (except amounts received for services performed as an employee of the United States or any
agency thereof) . . . .”).
60. See id.; see also Topic Number: 901 – Is a Person with Income from Puerto Rico Required
to File a U.S. Federal Income Tax Return?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc900/tc901 [https://perma.cc/9BZW-HY7B].
61. Puerto Rico’s ongoing economic woes are well documented. On January 18, 2017,
Governor Ricardo A. Rosselló signed into law an Enabling Act of the Fiscal Agency and Financial
Advisory Authority, Act 2-2017. The purpose of this law was to establish a “fiscal agent, financial
advisor and reporting agent of all the entities of the Government of Puerto Rico . . . and to assist
such entities in facing the grave fiscal crisis and economic emergency that Puerto Rico is currently
experiencing.” See Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency & Fin. Advisory Auth., About FAFAA, GOV’T
PUERTO RICO, http://www.aafaf.pr.gov/ [https://perma.cc/J4D9-RT58].
62. I.R.C. § 937(a) (2012).
63. See, e.g., Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 186 (2016)
(describing some of the compliance difficulties faced by a nonresident U.S. citizen); Christians,
Tina’s Story, supra note 56, at 834–35 (same).
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source of emulation by others. 64 However, the U.S. system cannot be replicated
widely without visiting chaos in the international tax regime and widespread
injustice on people who do not live in the country of their citizenship, or who
are dual nationals.
A major cost of the U.S. system is that taxing people on the basis of their
legal status alone is nearly impossible to administer, devastating to unsuspecting
long-term nonresident citizens, and demanding on the countries of their actual
residence (and often citizenship). 65 A second cost, the impact of which is much
less easy to measure, is that the “Hotel California” aspect of U.S. citizenshipbased taxation may make the United States overall less competitive in terms of
luring wealthy immigrants from other countries. 66 If adopted by other countries,
citizenship-based taxation would effectively nullify a century’s worth of effort
in preventing double taxation on a bilateral (and more recently multilateral)
basis, 67 as millions of people would suddenly be subject to multiple tax and
reporting regimes with no administrative relief. It would be unfortunate if these
costs are ignored by lawmakers in rich countries in the quest to eliminate artful
manoeuvring by their own taxpayers, as well as by other jurisdictions.
III. DOES TAX IMMIGRATION COMPETITION WORK?
The strategy to lure wealthy immigrants with tax expenditure programs may
be effective because the ultra rich have proven themselves to be very mobile and
very willing to chase tax incentives. 68 At the same time, albeit with the frictions
64. See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN
TAX MATTERS: THE CRS IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK 56 (2015) (explaining how the U.S.
adoption of disclosure rules for foreign financial institutions led to the development of a global
standard modeled on the same structure).
65. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L
389, 389 (2010) (“In a globalized world, citizenship-based taxation is an anachronism that should
be abandoned.”); Blum & Singer, supra note 50, at 707, 717 (calling for a change to residencebased taxation on grounds that the administration of citizenship-based taxation “is too difficult and
expensive for taxpayers and the IRS”); Christians, supra note 58 (making the case that taxing on
the basis of citizenship is inconsistent with international law to the extent it demands any assistance
from other countries to achieve compliance by their own residents and citizens); Mason, supra note
63, at 231 (analyzing the unintended consequences of taxing citizenship as a status).
66. See Mason, supra note 63, at 228–29 (explaining how an immigrant’s decision to become
a U.S. citizen “comes with a hefty-price tag: life-long worldwide taxation”).
67. Ariane Pickering, Why Negotiate Tax Treaties 6–8 (United Nations Working Paper, Papers
on Tax Treaties, No. 1-N, 2013).
68. Counting days of presence is therefore common among the community of expats seeking
to avoid establishing residence in any one of several countries in which they hold property and
enjoy spending time. Cf. James B. Stewart, Tax Me If You Can: The Things Rich People Do to
Avoid Paying Up, NEW YORKER (Mar. 12, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/
03/19/tax-me-if-you-can [https://perma.cc/5DK6-93E8] (explaining how wealthy New York City
residents avoid New York City tax by spending no more than 183 days in New York City, even if
they own a residence in the city and work there).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

BUYING IN: RESIDENCE AND CITIZENSHIP BY INVESTMENT

69

of family and other human relationships, the old observations about tax
competition apply equally whether the targeted activity involves paper profit
shifting or physical relocation of people and investments: an incentive is only as
good as its latest competition. 69 There was a time when the U.S. statutory
corporate tax rate was average or even low by world standards; tax competition
has lowered the rates across the OECD and has made the U.S. system appear
uncompetitive. 70 In response, U.S. companies plan their way around the U.S. tax
rules to achieve low effective tax rates. 71 Eliminating the opportunity to do that,
while other countries have lowered their own rates, is little more than an
invitation to outward migration of the wealthiest taxpayers.
Once tax residence (and by extension citizenship) is commodified, financial
and legal barriers to mobility for the extremely wealthy simply drop away,
making it virtually impossible for any state to tax their wealthiest residents.
When that happens, the very normative foundations underlying any tax system
that places different expectations upon its taxpayers based on their relative
ability to pay are shaken. The income tax can hardly sustain itself on an abilityto-pay basis when most countries are engaged in providing increasingly
generous tax expenditures to wealthy immigrants on the one hand, while
constantly warding off efforts by other countries to attract their own wealthiest
residents on the other.

69. This is perhaps why Canada recently abandoned its Immigrant Investor Program. See, e.g.,
Susana Mas, Millionaire Immigrant Investor Program Lures Only 7 Instead of 60, CBC NEWS (Jan.
22, 2016, 4:01 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/immigration-investor-pilot-program1.3331204 [https://perma.cc/UE2A-UV8R]. The revamped immigrant investor program in Canada
failed to attract the expected number of applicants. An immigration attorney stated that:
Canada was asking prospective immigrants to write a blank cheque and hope that 15 years
down the road they would see any return on that investment . . . [so it is] no surprise to see
that the wealthy immigrant investor crowd would look at other immigration possibilities to
come to this country in order to grow our economy, create jobs and find a secure place for
their own families.
Id.
70. Tax Found., OECD Corporate Income Tax Rates, 1981-2015, GITHUB.COM (Nov. 24,
2015), https://github.com/TaxFoundation/data/blob/master/OECD-corporate-income-tax-rates/OE
CD_corp_income_tax_rates_1981-2015.csv [https://perma.cc/PW6T-WTLF] (showing the fall of
corporate tax rates across the OECD from 1981 through 2015).
71. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41743, INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE TAX RATE COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 8, 26–27 (2014), https://fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/R41743.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSX4-HB3G]; Laura Power, The Devil Is in the
Details: A Comparison of the Corporate Average Effective Tax Rate Calculations Used by
Government Agencies 27 (U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No.
105, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP105.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G54-79Y6]. U.S. companies use a “combination of deferral of US
taxation on foreign source income and variety of transfer pricing and ‘hybrid’ entity structures . . .
to shift profits to low or no tax jurisdictions.” Id.
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While it is not clear what equilibrium will finally be reached as countries
compete with each other in this way, this seems to be a competition that only the
wealthiest countries can possibly win, where winning is described as having
attracted the most wealthy immigrants. Where this is accomplished by giving
tax breaks and incentives, winning also comes at a cost of revenue. Spillover
effects could include a slight increase in spending by the rich and perhaps some
increased regional employment, but neither of these effects is guaranteed.
General research regarding the efficacy of tax incentives to achieve spillover
effects is mixed but not encouraging. 72
The use of tax systems to assist wealthy individuals in effectively choosing
their tax residency for the maximum tax effect has a final feature that may
significantly impact how easy (or not) it is for countries to respond to taxpayers
playing tax residence games. This feature is the importance of claimed residence
in triggering information exchange obligations and rights among countries. As
alluded to above, most developed countries tax all of their individual residents,
regardless of nationality, on their worldwide incomes. 73 As a result, the OECD’s
multilateral automatic information exchange project, the Common Reporting
Standard (“CRS”), envisions a global system to identify the tax residence of
every individual that owns virtually any financial asset, anywhere in the world,
so that governments can assess their residents’ tax obligations. 74
However, owing to the sheer enormity of the task, this system largely relies
on the taxpayer’s own certification as to residence. 75 Governments might not
currently take the CRS regime or its core reliance on self-certification into
account in designing their immigration by investment programs, but given the
72. See, e.g., IMF, Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and Efficient Use of Tax
Incentives for Investment, Staff Report (Oct. 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/
101515.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XRZ-JHTJ] (“Countries often face pressures to attract investment
by offering tax incentives, which then erode the countries’ tax bases with little demonstrable benefit
in terms of increased investment.”).
73. See, e.g., HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 431–34 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining how different countries determine tax
residence); REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 28–29 (2007) (“The current trend for most
countries is to emulate the United States and adopt worldwide taxation of individual residents
. . . .”).
74. See Automatic Exchange of Information: Common Reporting Standard (CRS), OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/ [https://perma.cc/W2
T7-JWQ7] (describing the global information gathering and exchange regime). The U.S. rule,
known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, or FATCA, goes further, requiring the global
system to identify the nationality of every individual that owns virtually any financial asset,
anywhere in the world. See Summary of FACTA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/summary-of-fatcareporting-for-us-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/Z4UH-MZ7B].
75. See OECD, supra note 64, at 45, 57–58 (describing the function of self-certification for
account holders for triggering tax information reporting among participating countries).
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stakes, the world should expect that at least some will eventually recognize that
these elements create a marketable opportunity. A surge of innovative tax
residence programs designed to work the rules of the CRS regime (and perhaps
its parent, the U.S. FATCA regime) in favour of wealthy taxpayers might
therefore be an (unintended) outcome of the recent push for global cooperation
and coordination on international tax.
CONCLUSION
In scholarship critiquing states that sell citizenship to the rich, political
philosopher Rainer Bauböck likened citizenship to the Roman god Janus, whose
two faces symbolized his role as the god of transitions, gates, doorways,
beginnings and endings. 76 Just as Janus simultaneously looked to the past and
the future, Bauböck identified citizenship as simultaneously looking outward
and inward:
The external face turns to other states and demands that they recognise the
country’s passport as well as to citizens living abroad whom it promises the right
to return and diplomatic protection. The internal face speaks to citizens as
members of a democratic community [and] . . . tells them . . . they are equal as
individuals and collectively govern themselves through their right to vote. 77

Observers of tax policy could well note that two faces are insufficient to
capture the complex attitudes states have toward prospective residents and
citizens when it comes to taxation. For the world’s most prosperous individuals
and their families, multiple states extend a warm welcome. Some countries
anticipate significant lifestyle changes for those they seek to lure, requiring
lengthy physical presence to establish and keep their tax-favoured residency
status. But many are content to sell the legal status of tax residence and even
citizenship for a set price. For the latter, what the individual does with this legal
status is irrelevant. For the international tax regime, the consequences could be
severe.

76. See Rainer Bauböck, What Is Wrong with Selling Citizenship? It Corrupts Democracy!, in
Should Citizenship Be for Sale? 19, 19 (Ayelet Shachar & Rainer Bauböck eds., European Univ.
Inst., RSCAS Working Paper No. 01, 2014), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29318/RS
CAS_2014_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE9E-XQBM].
77. Id.
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